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 covering, was that in order to assure moments of superiority one
 had to cultivate hopeless loves.
 Vinnie said of her sister that "She fascinated everyone she saw."
 The flood of biographies which have followed Susan Dickinson's
 obituary notice attest to the validity of that remark. But Vinnie
 also noted that it was Emily's job "to think." She added that Emily
 was the only one of the Dickinsons "who had that to do." What
 she thought about were the great questions facing all sensitive na-
 tures in the later half of the nineteenth century: historical Chris-
 tianity, our alienation from Nature, the limitations of knowing,
 our longing for love, the consolations of art. It is, I suppose, naive
 to think that Richard Sewall has had the last word on the subject
 of "the Myth." But until unknown documents come to light his
 study easily replaces all previous biographies.
 FRANCIS MURPHY.
 Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law. By David Wigdor. [Contribu-
 tions in American History, No. 33.] (Westport, Conn.: Green-
 wood Press. 1974. Pp. xi, 356. $12.95-)
 Scholars invariably treat Roscoe Pound as a major figure in
 American legal and intellectual history, and yet they often discuss
 only a handful of his essays written in the half dozen years between
 19o6 and 1912. That seems anomalous for someone who lived
 ninety-four years, wrote literally millions of words, and for almost
 half a century enjoyed a reputation as the most distinguished legal
 philosopher in America. One of the merits of David Wigdor's bi-
 ography is to justify that anomalous treatment.
 Wigdor argues that Pound's creative work was limited by both
 his social-professional attitudes and his intellectual confusion.
 While the sociological and empirical thrust of his early essays con-
 tained progressive implications, Pound himself had only partial
 sympathy with the currents of political reform. His main concerns
 were to defend the common law tradition, to improve the existing
 legal system with minor procedural reforms, and to further pro-
 fessionalize and exalt the work of lawyers and judges. "Mechanical
 jurisprudence" was an evil primarily because it represented in-
 efficient technique and brought the legal profession under un-
 necessary criticism. Additionally, Wigdor seems to imply, "Me-
 chanical Jurisprudence" was a useful concept for an essentially
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 conservative set of values-it implied that the social difficulties the
 courts were involved in stemmed from faulty technique rather
 than from class bias. For Pound, then, true reform narrowed to a
 modification of judicial technique carried out by legal experts.
 Traditionalism and professionalism, by constantly placing what
 were essentially status-quo oriented ideological limits on his work,
 soon robbed it of its innovative, dynamic qualities.
 More broadly, Wigdor attributes the severe limitations of both
 Pound's political progressivism and his systematic jurisprudence
 to his "organicism." From his devotion to the common law, from
 late nineteenth-century sociology, from his training in botany,
 and from his own traditionalism, Pound came to conceive of so-
 ciety as an integrated organism-all parts mutually interrelated,
 self-contained, essentially unified, and progressively developing by
 stages toward a natural perfection. When that deeply held organi-
 cism confronted progressivism and instrumentalism in the years
 after 1900oo, the friction sparked Pound's period of greatest creativ-
 ity. The attempt to graft instrumentalism onto organicism, how-
 ever, also created a "crippling dualism" which "confined his ma-
 ture jurisprudence to a collection of brilliant but inconclusive
 insights" (285). Instrumentalism disguised his organicism, and or-
 ganicism distorted his instrumentalism; hence Pound's work after
 1920o never fulfilled the promise of the earlier essays. Wigdor con-
 cludes, Pound more and more sought recourse in administrative
 responsibilities and increasingly ponderous historical summaries.
 The emphasis on traditionalism and professionalism is apt, pro-
 viding a needed corrective to Pound's continuing reputation as a
 "progressive." The discussion of his theoretical confusion is pro-
 vocative but less convincing. The author seems to assume that
 there is some necessary connection between philosophical "instru-
 mentalism" and political "progressivism," between method and
 ideals. He suggests that Pound was forced to "compromise the in-
 strumentalist features of his thought" because fundamentally he
 "wanted to implement only those reforms that promoted one of
 his larger loyalties"-that is, traditionalism, professionalism, and
 organicism (209). And yet "larger loyalties," rather than being ex-
 ternal forces of perversion, are intrinsic parts of any "instrumental-
 ism." Pound may have been guilty of "compromise" in the minds
 of his pragmatic-progressive contemporaries, but his guilt is not
 so clear in light of either the continuing challenges of theoretical
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 jurisprudence or subsequent discoveries about the confusions in
 pragmatic-progressivism itself. In other words, that Pound's mind
 was plagued by an unresolvable theoretical confusion may well be
 true, but that the confusion was rooted in the necessary logical im-
 plications of two contradictory world views, "instrumentalism"
 and "organicism," seems unlikely and misleading.
 Wigdor concentrates on Pound's early years, telescoping the
 last half of his life into two of the eleven chapters. The result is
 an interpretative, rather than a comprehensive, biography. Its
 strengths are a clear focus, easy readability, and an insightful over-
 all evaluation of its subject. The author provides an extended dis-
 cussion of Pound's formative years in Nebraska and, in one of the
 most thoughtful sections of the book, illuminates the nature of his
 work as a botanist and its relationship to his later jurisprudence.
 Such a concise biography necessarily has gaps. Pound's personal
 life, and its connection with his public career, are touched on only
 briefly. The nature of his special guru-like function within the
 legal profession, especially in the later years, is merely suggested.
 Finally, his elaborate and formal work in jurisprudence is largely
 ignored. The whole book is essentially an argument to justify that
 exclusion, of course, and it is largely valid. Still, a chapter on
 Pound's systematic jurisprudence would have been useful to the
 general reader, and it could also have strengthened the author's
 thesis.
 Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law is a thoughtful, perceptive
 synthesis that leads the reader constantly to confront the questions
 of the significance and nature of Roscoe Pound's work. It will
 quickly and deservedly become a standard source, not only for
 Pound's career, but also for American legal and intellectual history
 in the twentieth century.
 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.
 The American Revolution of i8oo. By Daniel Sisson. (New York:
 Alfred A. Knopf. 1974. Pp. xiii, 468. $12.50.)
 Thomas Jefferson meant exactly what he said. The "Revolution
 of 18oo," which won him the presidency, was ". . as real a revolu-
 tion in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its
 form." The election of 18oo, says Daniel Sisson, launched yet an-
 other cycle of the continuing revolution in which Jefferson so pas-
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